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Abstract—This article presents an investigation into the 
theoretical and computational aspects of trust as applied to 
robots.  It begins with an in-depth review of the trust literature 
in search of a definition for trust suitable for implementation 
on a robot. Next we apply the definition to our interdependence 
framework for social action selection and develop an algorithm 
for determining if an interaction demands trust on the part of 
the robot. Finally, we apply our algorithm to several canonical 
social situations and review the resulting indications of whether 
or not the situation demands trust. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RUST. The term itself conjures vague notions of loving 
relationships and lifelong familial bonds. But is trust 
really so indefinable? The phenomenon of trust has been 
seriously explored by numerous researchers for decades. 
Moreover, the notion of trust is not limited to interpersonal 
interaction. Rather, trust underlies the interactions of 
employers with their employees, banks with their customers, 
and governments with their citizens. In many ways trust is a 
precursor to a great deal of normal interpersonal interaction.  
 For interactions involving humans and robots, an 
understanding of trust is particularly important. Because 
robots are embodied, their actions can have serious 
consequences for the humans around them. Injuries and even 
fatal accidents have occurred because of a robot’s actions 
[1]. A great deal of research is currently focused on bringing 
robots out of labs and into people’s homes and workplaces. 
These robots will interact with humans—such as children 
and the elderly—unfamiliar with the limitations of a robot. It 
is therefore critical that human-robot interaction research 
explore the topic of trust.   
 The work presented here builds upon our prior research 
developing an interdependence framework for social action 
selection by a robot [2]. Our framework (discussed in greater 
detail in the next section) uses a matrix representation to 
represent the robot’s social interactions. These outcome 
matrices contain values relating to the robot’s and the 
human’s reward with respect to the selection of particular 
actions. Interdependence theorists have shown that these 
outcome matrices can be used to represent any interaction 
[3]. In contrast to much of the prior work on trust, the 
research presented here does not begin with a model for 
trust. Rather, it begins with a very simple hypothesis: if it is 
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true that outcome matrices serve as a representation for 
interaction, and that all interactions can be represented as 
an outcome matrix, then should it not also be true that some 
outcome matrices include trust while others do not? If so, 
then one should be able to delineate conditions segregating 
those outcome matrices that require trust from those that do 
not. The task then becomes one of determining what the 
conditions for trust are. 
 This article presents an investigation into the theoretical 
and computational aspects of trust as applied to robots. It 
begins with an in-depth review of the trust literature in 
search of a definition for trust suitable for implementation on 
a robot. Next this definition is applied to our 
interdependence framework for social action selection and 
developed into an algorithm for determining if an interaction 
demands trust on the part of the robot. Finally, the algorithm 
is applied to several canonical social situations and the 
results reviewed for indications of whether or not the 
situation demands trust.  
 The algorithm we describe has been implemented and 
tested on embodied robots [4]. Because of space 
considerations, it was not possible to both thoroughly detail 
our lengthy investigation of the phenomena of trust and its 
theoretical underpinnings and to also present our 
experiments involving robots. The results from these 
experiments will be presented in a subsequent paper.   
II. TRUST: A BRIEF REVIEW 
A. Defining Trust 
Early trust research focused on definitions and 
characterizations of the phenomenon. Morton Deutsch is 
widely recognized as one of the first researchers to study 
trust [5]. Deutsch, a psychologist, describes trust as a facet 
of human personality [6]. He claims that trust is the result of 
a choice among behaviors in a specific situation. Deutsch’s 
definition of trust focused on the individual’s perception of 
the situation and the cost/benefit analysis that resulted. He 
also proposes the existence of different types of trust. Other 
types include trust as despair, innocence, impulsiveness, 
virtue, masochism, faith, risk-taking, and confidence [7]; see 
[5] for an overview).  
 Niklas Luhmann, another early trust researcher, provides a 
sociological perspective [8]. Luhmann defines trust as a 
means for reducing the social complexity and risk of daily 
life. He argues that the complexity of the natural world is far 
too great for an individual to manage the many decisions it 
must make in order to survive. Because a trusting society has 
greater capacity for managing complexity, it can afford to be 
more flexible in terms of actions and experience.  
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 Bernard Barber, another sociologist, defines trust as an 
expectation or mental attitude an agent maintains regarding 
its social environment [9]; see [5] for an overview). He 
claims that trust results from learning in a social system and 
is used by an individual to manage its expectations regarding 
its relationships and social environment. Hence, trust is an 
aspect of all social relationships and is used as a means of 
prediction for the individual.  
Gambetta describes trust as a probability [10]. 
Specifically, he claims that, “trust is a particular level of 
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action, both before he can monitor such action and in a 
context in which it affects his own action” [10] p. 216). 
Gambetta defines trust as a probabilistic assessment of 
another agent’s intent to perform an action on which the 
agent will rely.  
 Rousseau et al. have examined the definitional differences 
of trust from a variety of sources [11] and concluded that 
trust researchers generally agree on the conditions necessary 
for trust, namely risk and interdependence.  
 Lee and See consider trust from the perspective of 
machine automation, providing an extremely insightful and 
thorough review of the trust literature [12]. They review 
many definitions of trust and propose a definition that is a 
compilation of the many previous definitions. Namely, trust 
is the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s 
goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and 
vulnerability. This research uses Lee and See’s definition of 
trust to generate a more conceptually precise and operational 
description of trust. We define trust in terms of two 
individuals—a trustor and a trustee. The trustor is the 
individual doing the trusting. The trustee represents the 
individual in which trust is placed. Based on the definitions 
and descriptions above, trust is defined as  
a belief, held by the trustor, that the trustee will 
act in a manner that mitigates the trustor’s risk 
in a situation in which the trustor has put its 
outcomes at risk.  
Like the work of Luhmann and Gambetta, the presence of 
risk is addressed. As with Deutsch, the proposed definition 
also makes note of the trustor’s choice of action. The term 
belief is used, instead of attitude, because agent belief has 
been operationalized as the probability of a truth statement 
in related literature and because we feel that difference is 
inconsequential to the definition [10].  
B. Models and Measures of Trust 
Researchers have generated many different computational 
models of trust. This research approaches the problem of 
modeling trust by showing that our interdependence 
framework for social action selection implicitly contains 
mechanisms for determining if trust is necessary for a given 
social situation. Before detailing our framework several 
different methods for modeling and measuring trust are 
described.   
King-Casas et al. used a situation in which two human 
players iteratively interact for ten rounds exchanging money 
as an investor and as a trustee [13]. In each round the 
investor selects some proportion of money to invest ( ) with 
the trustee. The money appreciates (3 ). Finally the 
trustee repays a self determined proportion of the total 
amount ( ) back to the investor. King-Casas et al. found 
previous reciprocity to be the best predictor of changes in 
trust for both the investor and trustee ( 0.56; 0.31 
respectively where  is the correlation coefficient) [13]. 
Hence, by measuring quantities of reciprocity, trust is 
operationalized as monetary exchange in a way that allows 
for online analysis of the relationship from its inception. The 
work by King-Casas et al. puts the trustor at monetary risk. 
Yet, if previous reciprocity indicates the presence of trust 
then the trustor expects that the trustee will act in a manner 
that mitigates his or her risk, and both parties benefit from 
mutual trust.   
Marsh defines trust in terms of utility for a rational agent 
[5]. Further, Marsh recognizes the importance of the 
situation and includes this factor in his formulation of trust. 
He estimates trust as, , · ·  
where ,  is x’s trust in y for situation α,  is the 
utility of α for x,  is the importance of α for x, and 
 is the general trust of x in y. Marsh notes many 
weaknesses, flaws, and inconsistencies in this formulation. 
For example, he states the value range he has chosen for 
trust,  1, 1 , presents problems when trust is zero.    
 Recently a trend in trust research has been to focus on the 
use of probability theory to measure and model trust. Josang 
and Lo Presti use probabilities to represent an agent’s 
assessment of risk [14]. They describe an agent’s decision 
surface with respect to risk as ,  where C is the agent’s total social capital2, 0,1  is the fraction of 
the agent’s capital it is willing to invest in a single 
transaction with another agent, p is the probability that the 
transaction will end favorably,  is gain resulting from the 
transaction and 0, ∞  is a factor used to moderate the 
gain . Josang and Lo Presti define reliability trust as the 
value of p and decision trust as 0  for  where 
 is a cut-off probability. Josang and Pope later use this 
model of trust to propagate trust and reputation information 
for the purpose of developing a secure network cluster [14-
16]. Beth et al. also use probability for the purpose of 
developing trust in network security claiming that the 
equation 1 , where p is the number of positive 
experiences and α is chosen to be a value high enough to 
produce confident estimations should be used to measure 
trust [17].   
 Castelfranchi and Falcone have been strong critics of 
defining trust in terms of probability because they feel this 
description of trust is too simplistic [18]. Rather, they 
describe a cognitive model of trust that rests on an agent’s 
mental state. This mental state is in turn controlled by an 
 
2 Social capital is concept from economics used to describe the value of 
the connections within a social network.   
  
agent’s beliefs with respect to the other agent and an agent’s 
own goals [19, 20].  
 Researchers have also explored the role of trust in 
machine automation. Trust in automation researchers are 
primarily concerned with creating automation that will allow 
users to develop the proper level of trust in the system. Lee 
and See note that one fundamental difference between trust 
in automation research and intrapersonal trust research is 
that automation lacks intentionality [12]. Another 
fundamental difference is that human-automation 
relationships tend to be asymmetric with the human deciding 
how much to trust the automation but not vice versa. 
 Researchers have explored many different methods for 
measuring and modeling trust. Trust measures have been 
derived from information withholding (deceit) [21], agent 
reliability [22, 23], agent opinion based on deceitful actions 
[16], compliance with virtual social norms [24], and 
compliance with an a priori set of trusted behaviors from a 
case study [25]. Models of trust range from beta probability 
distributions over agent reliability [16], to knowledge-based 
formulas for trust [25], to perception-specific process 
models for trust [24].  
 Often these measures and models of trust are tailored to 
the researcher’s particular domain of investigation. Luna-
Reyes et al., for example, derive their model from a 
longitudinal case study of an interorganizational information 
technology project in New York State [25]. This model is 
then tested to ensure that it behaves in a manner that 
intuitively reflects the phenomena of trust. A review of 
computational trust and reputation models by Sabater and 
Sierra states, “… current (trust and reputation) models are 
focused on specific scenarios with very delimited tasks to be 
performed by the agents” and “A plethora of computational 
trust and reputation models have appeared in the last years, 
each one with its own characteristics and using different 
technical solutions [26].”   
The alternative methods for evaluating trust discussed in 
this section highlight a diversity of approaches and domains 
the topic of trust touches on. As will be shown, rather than 
creating another computational model of trust, the definition 
of trust above can be used in conjunction with our 
interdependence framework to determine if a social situation 
demands trust. In the section that follows our framework for 
social action selection is briefly described.  
III. REPRESENTING INTERACTION 
Social psychologists define social interaction as influence—
verbal, physical, or emotional—by one individual on another 
[27]. Representations for interaction have a long history in 
social psychology and game theory [28, 29]. 
Interdependence theory, a type of social exchange theory, is 
a psychological theory developed as a means for 
understanding and analyzing interpersonal situations and 
interaction [29]. The term interdependence specifies the 
extent to which one individual of a dyad influences the 
other. Interdependence theory is based on the claim that 
people adjust their interactive behavior in response to their 
perception of a social situation’s pattern of rewards and 
costs. Thus, each choice of interactive behavior by an 
individual offers the possibility of specific rewards and 
costs—also known as outcomes—after the interaction. 
Interdependence theory represents interaction and social 
situations computationally as an outcome matrix (Figure 1). 
An outcome matrix represents an interaction by expressing 
the outcomes afforded to each interacting individual with 
respect each pair of potential behaviors chosen by the 
individuals.  
 
Figure 1  Example outcome matrices are depicted above. The right hand 
side depicts an outcome matrix representing a interaction between a robot 
and a human partner in a search and rescue paradigm. The left hand side 
depicts a social situation. Social situations abstractly represent interactions. 
Game theory also explores interaction [28]. As a branch 
of applied mathematics, game theory thus focuses on the 
formal consideration of strategic interactions, such as the 
existence of equilibriums and economic applications [28]. 
Game theory and interdependence theory both use the 
outcome matrix to represent interaction [28, 29]. Game 
theory, however, is limited by several assumptions, namely: 
both individuals are assumed to be outcome maximizing; to 
have complete knowledge of the game including the 
numbers and types of individuals and each individual’s 
payoffs; and each individual’s payoffs are assumed to be 
fixed throughout the game. Because it assumes that 
individuals are outcome maximizing, game theory can be 
used to determine which actions are optimal and will result 
in an equilibrium of outcome. Interdependence theory does 
not make these assumptions and does not lend itself to 
analysis by equilibrium of outcomes.  
The outcome matrix is a standard computational 
representation for interaction [29]. The term interaction 
describes a discrete event in which two or more individuals 
select interactive behaviors as part of a social situation or 
social environment. The term individual is used to indicate 
either a human, a social robot, or an agent. This research 
focuses on interaction involving two individuals—dyadic 
interaction. 
Because outcome matrices are computational 
representations, it is possible to describe them formally. The 
notation presented here draws heavily from game theory 
[28]. A representation of interaction consists of 1) a finite set 
N of interacting individuals; 2) for each individual  a 
nonempty set  of actions; 3) the utility obtained by each 
individual for each combination of actions that could have 














































Example Outcome Matrices 
  
individual i’s set of actions. Let , … ,  denote a 
combination of actions, one for each individual, and let iu  
denote individual i’s utility function: , … , ℛ is 
the utility received by individual i if the individuals choose 
the actions , … , . The term  is used to denote an 
outcome matrix. The superscript -i is used to express 
individual i's partner. Thus, for example,  denotes the 
action set of individual i and denotes the action set of 
individual i’s interactive partner.   
IV. RECOGNIZING SITUATIONS THAT REQUIRE TRUST 
The task of delineating the conditions for trust begins with 
our working definition of trust. Recall that, trust was defined 
as a belief, held by the trustor, that the trustee will act in a 
manner that mitigates the trustor’s risk in a situation in 
which the trustee has put its outcomes at risk.    
 Recall that social situations abstractly represent a class of 
interactions. This section develops conditions for classifying 
a situation in terms of trust. Classification of a situation in 
terms of trust is a binary task, i.e. a true/false statement 
concerning whether or not the selection of an action in a 
situation would require trust.   
 
Figure 2  An example of the trust fall. The trust fall is a trust and team-
building exercise in which one individual, the trustor, leans back prepared 
to fall to the ground. Another individual, the trustee, catches the first 
individual. The exercise builds trust because the trustor puts himself at risk 
expecting that the trustee will break her fall. 
 Consider, for example, the trust fall. The trust fall is a 
game played in an attempt to build trust between two or 
more people. One person simply leans backward and falls 
into the awaiting arms of another person (Figure 2). The 
trust fall will be used as a running example to explain our 
conditions for trust. 
 Assume that the trust fall involves two people. The person 
leaning back acts as the trustor, whereas the person doing the 
catching represents the trustee. The trustor decides between 
two potential actions in the interaction: lean back and do not 
lean back. The trustee also decides between two potential 
actions: catch the falling person and do not catch the falling 
person. Hence the interaction can be represented as a 2x2 
outcome matrix (Figure 3). In this interaction the trustor 
holds the belief that the trustee will break their fall before 
they hit the ground. Moreover, the action of leaning back 
puts the trustor at risk of possible injury. The actual result of 
the interaction depends on the actions of the trustee. Their 
choice of action can result in injury or no injury to the 
trustor. As described, the situation implies a specific pattern 
of outcome values.     
 The definition for trust listed above focuses on the actions 
of the trustor and trustee. These individuals can be arbitrarily 
listed as the interacting individuals in an outcome matrix 
(Figure 3). Without loss of generality, our discussion of the 
decision problem will be limited to two actions (  and  
for the trustor,  and  for the trustee). Let  arbitrarily 
labeled as the trusting action and  as the untrusting action 
for the trustor. Similarly, for the trustee the action  
arbitrarily denotes the action which maintains trust and the 
action  the action which does not maintain trust. The 
definition for trust implies a specific temporal pattern for 
trusting interaction. Because the definition requires risk on 
the part of the trustor, the trustor cannot know with certainty 
which action the trustee will select. It therefore follows that 
1) the trustee does not act before the trustor. This temporal 
order is described with the condition in outcome matrix 
notation as  indicating that individual i acts before 
individual -i. 
 The definition for trust notes that risk is an important 
consideration for the trustor. Risk refers to a potential loss of 
outcome. The occurrence of risk implies that the outcome 
values received by the trustor depend on the action of the 
trustee. Our second condition notes this dependence relation 
by stating that 2) the outcome received by the trustor 
depends on the actions of the trustee if and only if the trustor 
selects the trusting action. Recall that  denotes the 
outcome received by the trustor. If the trustor selects the 
trusting action then the outcomes  and  from Figure 
3 are being compared. The statement indicates that there will 
be a difference,   , where  is a constant 
representing the minimal amount of outcome for 
dependence.  
The trustor may also select the untrusting action, however. 
The existence of the untrusting action implies that this action 
does require risk on the part of the trustor. In other words, 
the outcome   received by the trustor when selecting 
the untrusting action does not depend on the actions of the 
trustee. This leads to a third condition, 3) the outcome 
received when selecting the untrusting action does not 
depend of the actions of the trustee. In other words, the 
outcomes for action  do not depend on the action selected 
by the trustee. Stated formally,  , where  
is a constant representing the maximal amount of outcome 
for independence.  
  
 
Figure 3  The figure visually depicts the reasoning behind the development of the conditions for trust. The matrix on the left depicts the conditions for trust 
on an abstract social situation. The matrix to the right presents the conditions for the trust fall example. Conditions two, three and four are depicted in the 
example. Conditions one and five are not depicted.  
The definition for trust implies a specific pattern of 
outcome values. It indicates that the trustor is motivated to 
select the trusting action only if the trustee mitigates the 
trustor’s risk. If the trustee is not expected to mitigate the 
trustor’s risk then it would be better for the trustor to not 
select the trusting action. Restated as a condition for trust, 4) 
the value, for the trustor, of fulfilled trust (the trustee acts in 
manner which mitigates the risk) is greater than the value of 
not trusting at all, is greater than the value of having one’s 
trust broken. Again described formally, the outcomes are 
valued  . 
 Finally, the definition demands that, 5) the trustor must 
hold a belief that the trustee will select action  with 
sufficiently high probability, formally  where k 
is some sufficiently large constant.  
 The preceding conditions are necessary for a trusting 
interaction. Sufficiency occurs when these conditions are 
met and the trustor selects action . The first four 
conditions describe the situational conditions necessary for 
trust. By testing a situation for these conditions one can 
determine whether or not an interactive situation requires 
trust. Figure 4 presents an algorithm for determining if a 
putative situation requires trust. 
The trust fall is used as an example in Figure 3 to 
delineate the conditions for trust. The first condition will be 
assumed to be true for this example. The second condition 
results in values (from the matrix) 6 6 . Thus, 
action  does depend on the actions of the partner for 
constant 12. The values assigned to the constants 
, ,  are likely to be domain specific. The constant 
 represents a threshold for the amount of risk associated 
with the trusting action. The constant , on the other hand, 
represents a threshold for the lack of risk associated with the 
untrusting action. The third condition results in values, 
|0 0| . Here, the action  does not depend on the 
actions of the partner for constant 0. The final 
condition results in values 6 0,0 6. Hence, for 
individual one, the selection of action  involves risk that 
can be mitigated by the actions of the partner and the 
selection of action  does not involve risk that is mitigated 
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Do not catch 
person 
Condition 2 
Condition 3 The outcome received by the trustor does not depend on the action of the trustee if  trustor selects the untrusting action. 
Condition 4 For the trustor, selecting the trusting action and having the trustee maintain 
trust is preferred to selecting the untrusting action. Further, selecting the 
untrusting action is preferred to selecting the trusting action and having the 
trustee not maintain trust. Example, 6 >0,0>-6. 
Trustee
Testing for Situational Trust 
 
Input: Outcome matrix O 
Assumptions: Individual i is trustor, individual -i is trustee,   
is the trusting action,  is not a trusting action. 
Output: Boolean stating if O requires trust on the part of 
individual i. 
1. If   is false  //the trustee does not act before 
return false    //the trustor 
2. If    //the trustor’s outcome must  
return false    //depend on the action of trustee 
          // when selecting the trusting action 
3. If    //the trustor’s outcome must not the 
return false    //depend on the action of the trustee 
          //when selecting the untrusting action 
4. If   is false //the value of fulfilled trust 
return false   //is greater than the value of not  
 Else     //trusting at all, is greater than the value  
 return true   //of having one’s trust broken 
Figure 4  The algorithm above depicts a method for determining
whether a social situation requires trust. The algorithm assumes that the
first individual is the trustor, the second individual is the trustee, the action
 is the trusting action, and the action  is not a trusting action. 
  
  
V. COMMON SITUATIONS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR TRUST 
In this section those situations which meet the conditions for 
trust are qualitatively compared to those which do not. The 
goal is to demonstrate that the situations selected by the 
algorithm as demanding trust intuitively match those 
situations in which humans use trust. Additionally, we strive 
to show that situations which are typically not considered to 
demand trust are also deemed to not require trust by the 
algorithm. It is suspected that additional experiments 
involving human subjects will be necessary to provide more 
conclusive evidence that our algorithm does indeed classify 
situations similarly to humans with respect to trust.  
Kelley et al. recently published an atlas of social 
situations based interdependence theory’s interdependence 
space [3]. The atlas describes several canonical social 
situations as well as each situation’s characteristics. Five 
situations listed in Kelly et al.’s atlas of social situations 
were selected as input to our algorithm. Table 1 lists these 
five social situations. The situations were selected because 
they represent different areas within the interdependence 
space. Each situation was used as input to the algorithm in 
Figure 4. The values for constants were arbitrarily set at 
6 and 6. The independent variable is the 
situations selected for testing. The dependent variable then is 
the determination of whether or not the situation demands 
trust. 
 The results are listed in the rightmost column of Table 1. 
This column states whether or not the algorithm indicates 
that the situation demands trust on the part of the trustor. 
The trustor is assumed to be the individual depicted on the 
top of the matrix. The trusting action is assumed to be 
located in the first column of each matrix. These 
assumptions are simply for clarity of exposition and do not 
limit the algorithm.  
 For example consider the Cooperative Situation, the first 
row from Table 1. The outcome matrix for the situation is 
used as input to the algorithm. The first line in the algorithm 
is assumed to be true. The second line of the algorithm 
calculates   as 13 6 6. Hence the second 
condition for situational trust is true. The third line of the 
algorithm calculates   as |6 6| 6. This 
third condition for situational trust is also found to be true. 
Finally, the forth line of the algorithm computes 
  to be 13 6,6 6 which is false. The final 
output of the algorithm for this situation is false. 
 Details for each of the situations examined follows: 
1. The Cooperative situation describes a social situation 
in which both individuals interact cooperatively in order to 
receive maximal outcomes. Given the algorithm’s 
parameters, the trustor faces a situation in which the trusting 
action is dependent on the trustee. The untrusting action, in 
contrast, is not dependent on the trustee. Nevertheless, the 
trustor stands to lose nothing if the trustee does not maintain 
trust (6 versus 6). Hence, selection of the trusting action 
does not involve risk as the trustor stands to minimally gain 
as much by selecting this action as by selecting the 
untrusting action. The algorithm therefore returns false 
because the situation does not meet all of the conditions for 
trust.    
Table 1 Several situations from Kelley et al.’s atlas of social situations are 
depicted below. The table includes a description of the situation and the 
situation’s outcome matrix. The first condition the algorithm in Figure 4 is 
assumed to hold for all situations. Columns 3-5 present the results for the 
remaining conditions. The right most column presents the algorithm’s final 
output, stating whether or not the situation demands trust. 
Social Situations for Qualitative Comparison 
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2. The Competitive situation also does not demand trust, 
but for different reasons. In this situation the trusting and 
untrusting actions afford equal risk. Thus the trustor does not 
face a decision problem in which it can select an action that 
will mitigate its risk. Rather, the trustor’s decision problem 
is simply of a matter of selecting the action with the largest 
guaranteed outcome. Trust is unnecessary because the 
trustor’s decision problem can be solved without any 
consideration of the trustee’s beliefs and actions.   
3. The Trust Situation describes a situation in which 
mutual cooperation is in the best interests of both 
individuals. As the name would portend, this situation 
demands trust. The trustor’s outcomes are dependent on the 
action of the trustee if it selects the trusting action. Further, 
nominal outcomes are risked when selecting untrusting 
action. Finally, the trustor stands to gain the most if it selects 
the trusting action and the trustee maintains the trust. The 
trustor’s second best option is not to trust the trustee. 
Finally, the trustor’s worst option is to select the trusting 
action and to have the trustee violate that trust. 
4. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is perhaps the most 
extensively studied of all social situations [30]. In this 
situation, both individual’s depend upon one another and are 
also in conflict. Moreover, selection of the trusting action by 
the trustor does place outcomes at risk dependent on the 
action of the trustee. Given the parameters selected, 
however, the untrusting action is also critically dependent on 
the action of the trustee. Hence, both actions require some 
degree of risk on the part of the trustor. Our conditions for 
situational trust demand that the decision problem faced by 
  
the trustor offer the potential for selecting a less risky action. 
As instantiated in Table 1, this version of the prisoner’s 
dilemma does not offer a less risky option. Note, however, 
that by changing one of the trustor outcomes, say 8 to 9, and 
the algorithm’s constants to 8 and 9 the situation 
does then demand situational trust. Overall, the prisoner’s 
dilemma is a borderline case in which the specific values of 
the outcomes determine whether or not the situation 
demands trust. This social situation raises important issues 
that will be discussed in the conclusion.    
5. The Chicken situation is a prototypical social situation 
encountered by people. In this situation each interacting 
individual chooses between safe actions with intermediate 
outcomes or more risky actions with more middling 
outcomes. An example might be the negotiation of a contract 
for a home or some other purchase. This situation, like the 
Trust Situation, demands trust because it follows the same 
pattern of risks as the Trust Situation.  
 Overall, this analysis provides some intuitive evidence 
that our algorithm does correctly classify situations with 
respect to trust. A more comprehensive test of the 
algorithm’s accuracy will require the use of a human subject 
pool, placing them in imaginary or virtual social situations, 
asking them if they believe that the situation or the selection 
of an action in a situation demands trust and then applying 
the algorithm in the same situation. We are currently setting 
up the infrastructure to perform this experiment.        
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article has focused on the theoretical and computation 
underpinnings necessary for developing a robot with the 
capacity to recognize social situations in which it must trust 
the actions of a person or a person is trusting it. It began 
with a thorough interdisciplinary investigation of the trust 
literature which resulted in an operationalized definition of 
trust. Next it was hypothesized that the definition could be 
used to develop a series of conditions which could then 
segregate those social situations demanding trust from 
situations that do not demand trust. Finally an algorithm was 
developed based on these conditions and then tested on 
several well known social situations.  
 This work is important for several reasons. First, it 
addresses an important area of robotics and human-robot 
interaction research. Second, the approach taken does not 
demand artificial or ad hoc models of trust developed for a 
particular problem or paradigm. Our definition and 
algorithm is completely general and not impacted by the 
characteristics of the human, the robot, or the problem being 
explored. This work highlights theoretical and conceptual 
aspects of trust that have not been explored in previous 
work—most notably the role of interdependence in social 
situations involving trust. Finally, the algorithm and 
concepts expounded here should hold regardless of whether 
the robot is the trustor or the trustee. Hence, the robot should 
be able to determine if it is trusting someone else or if 
someone else is trusting it.  
 This research has hinted at another possible type of 
trust—forced trust. Forced trust is defined here as a situation 
in which the trustor has only trusting actions from which to 
choose. As mentioned in the previous section, our algorithm 
indicated that the outcome matrix representing the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma did not demand trust because all actions available 
to the trustee presented risk. Hence, the decision faced by 
the trustor is one in which they are forced to trust the trustee. 
This result hints that, as argued by Deustch, there may be 
multiple types of trust with differing characteristics [7]. 
Colloquially the term trust may apply to a single action 
choice. Hence, in situations in which the trustor’s action 
space is greater than two actions, one often describes trust 
with respect to the selection of a particular risky action 
among many potential actions. In force trust situations, then 
describe situations in which all of the trustor’s actions 
present risk mitigated by the actions of the trustee.  
 This article has largely been silent as to the decision 
problem faced by the trustee. Situations in which the trustee 
has a large incentive to maintain the trust or to violate the 
trust tend to influence one’s measure of trust by mitigating 
or enhancing the trustor’s risk [10, 13, 14]. Nevertheless, 
these situations still demand trust because of the existence of 
risk and the trustor’s dependence on the trustee. The 
techniques described in this paper have been used to 
formulate a measure of trust which takes into consideration 
the decision problem faced by the trustee [4].    
 The challenges of creating matrices from the perceptual 
information available to a robot have not discussed. These 
challenges have been addressed in our previous research [4]. 
 We believe that applications of the algorithm to human-
robot interaction problems constitute an important area of 
research. Further, numerous aspects of our interdependence 
framework for social action selection have been verified on 
embodied robots [4].    
 Our continuing work in this area centers on demonstrating 
these techniques on robots in interactive situations with 
humans. We are investigating both situations in which the 
robot is the trustee and the trustor. We are also empirically 
verifying our definition for trust and exploring the 
conjecture pertaining to forced trust. Finally, we are 
attempting to identify demonstrable applications in the 
domain of home healthcare and military robotics. Because 
trust underlies some much of normal interpersonal 
interaction, we believe that a principled approach will be 
critical to the success of creating trusting and trustworthy 
robots.   
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